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Abstract
Research on error observation has focused predominantly on situations in which individuals are passive observers of errors.
In daily life, however, we are often jointly responsible for the mistakes of others. In the current study, we examined how
information on agency is integrated in the error observation network. It was found that activation in the anterior insula but
not in the posterior medial frontal cortex or lateral prefrontal cortex differentiates between observed errors for which we
are partly responsible or not. Interestingly, the activation pattern of the AI was mirrored by feelings of guilt and shame.
These results suggest that the anterior insula is crucially involved in evaluating the consequences of our actions for other
persons. Consequently, this region may be thought of as critical in guiding social behavior.
Key words: error observation, agency, fMRI
Introduction
Errors often have negative consequences for the agent of the
error. For example, a rider in a cycle race is likely to crash if he
makes a steering mistake during a descent. In order to avoid
such negative outcomes, it is important that we are able to effi-
ciently monitor our actions for errors. A long tradition of neuro-
physiological research has identified that this function is
supported primarily by a network including the posterior med-
ial frontal cortex (pMFC), the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) and
the anterior insula (AI) (for reviews, see Ridderinkhof et al., 2004;
Taylor et al., 2007; Ullsperger et al., 2014). More precisely, it is
assumed that activation in the pMFC reflects the detection and
prediction of errors (Falkenstein et al., 1990; Botvinick et al.,
2001; Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Brown and Braver, 2005;
Rushworth and Behrens, 2008), whereas the LPFC is responsible
for subsequent adaptions in cognitive control (Kerns et al., 2004;
Marco-Pallare´s et al., 2008), and the AI is involved in the con-
cious awareness (Ullsperger et al., 2010) and affective evaluation
(Koban et al., 2010, 2013; Koban and Pourtois, 2014) of errors.
Interestingly, the same network is also found to be activated
when another person is observed making an error (Shane et al.,
2008; De Bruijn et al., 2009; Koban et al., 2013; Yu et al., 2014),
suggesting that monitoring self-generated and observed behav-
ior relies on the same neural mechanisms (e.g. Miltner et al.,
2004; van Schie et al., 2004; Bates et al., 2005; De Bruijn et al.,
2009).
However, research on error observation has primarily
focused on situations in which participants are passive obser-
vers of errors (Shane et al., 2008; Newman-Norlund et al., 2009;
Howard-Jones et al., 2010; Monfardini et al., 2013; Desmet et al.,
2014). In daily life, on the other hand, errors are often embedded
in an interactive context. As a result, we may sometimes share
responsibility for the errors other people make. Imagine, for
instance, that the abovementioned rider made a steering mis-
take because he was pressured by the team leader to speed up.
In this situation the team leader is partly responsible for the
error of the rider. Preventing the situation from reoccurring
therefore requires that the team leader acknowledges his share
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in the rider’s mistake. In more general terms, the above
example illustrates that prosocial and moral behavior crucially
rests on the ability to correctly assign agency in interactive situ-
ations (e.g. Koban et al., 2013; Yu et al., 2014; Cui et al., 2015;
Lepron et al., 2015). In spite of its important social function,
however, it is still unknown how the evaluation of agency is
integrated in the error observation network. Therefore, the aim
of the current study is to test how activation in this network
varies as a function of agency.
Considering the functions that have been ascribed to the dif-
ferent regions of the error network, a likely candidate to evalu-
ate the degree of agency over an observed error is the AI. As
outlined above, this region is consistently found in response to
both self-generated (e.g. Ullsperger and von Cramon, 2001, 2004;
Marco-Pallare´s et al., 2008) and observed (e.g. De Bruijn et al.,
2009; Koban et al., 2013; Yu et al., 2014) errors. In line with its role
in interoceptive awareness (Critchley et al., 2004; Craig, 2009;
Ullsperger et al., 2010), it has been suggested that the role of the
AI is to signal the affective consequences of intentional actions
(Brass and Haggard, 2010). Interestingly, evidence linking the AI
to the simulation of vicarious emotions (Wicker et al., 2003) and
vicarious pain (Singer et al., 2004; Lamm et al., 2011) suggests
that it may not only evaluate the consequences of an action for
oneself, but also for others (Koban et al., 2013; Koban and
Pourtois, 2014). In support of this idea, a number of studies
have now shown that the AI responds more strongly to
vicarious pain when it is the result of an error made by oneself
compared with an error made by someone else (Koban et al.,
2013; Cui et al., 2015) or by both oneself and someone else
(Yu et al., 2014; Cui et al., 2015). Considering the earlier, the AI
thus seems well suited to perform an affective evaluation of
the degree of agency one has over an observed error.
Specifically, observed errors for which an individual shares
responsibility may generate an emotional signal in the AI,
perhaps in the form of guilt or shame, that encourages the
individual to adapt his/her behavior in accordance with the
social norm (Koban et al., 2013; Koban and Pourtois, 2014; Yu
et al., 2014).
To test these assumptions we designed an interactive task
in which participants would sometimes accidentally create a
difficult situation for their co-player. Because the co-player was
more likely to make an error in the difficult situation, this task
allows us to study the influence of agency on the error observa-
tion network. Specifically, in the current task, agency over an
observed error can be studied both before and after the actual
error is made. First, the influence of agency can be investigated
before an error is observed by measuring error network activa-
tion when the actions of the participant create a difficult
situation for the co-player. In line with studies that have shown
error activation both in response to actions that have negative
consequences for oneself and to actions that have negative
consequences for others (Koban et al., 2013; Yu et al., 2014; Cui
et al., 2015), we expect the action monitoring network to be
activated when an action is likely to cause an error by the
co-player. When the difficult situation does indeed result in
an error by the co-player, we expect the observation of this
error to primarily activate the AI. This is based on the idea
that the AI appraises the degree of agency over an observed
error. Finally, if the AI signals shared responsibility over an
error by generating an emotional signal, we can expect




Twenty-five subjects took part in the experiment (17 females,
Mage¼ 23.16, SDage¼ 2.43) and were paid 28 euro for their partici-
pation. However, as explained below, six participants were
excluded from analysis. This resulted in a final sample of 19
subjects (14 females, Mage¼ 23.00, SDage¼ 2.58). All of them were
right-handed according to the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory
(Oldfield, 1971), had no history of neurological disorders, and
gave written informed consent. The study was approved by the
Medical Ethic Review Board of the Ghent University Hospital.
Task, design and stimuli
To test how error observation processes are modulated by
agency, we used an adaptation of the social speeded flanker
task. In this task, two individuals alternately execute and ob-
serve a flanker trial. In the execution trials, participants see an
array of arrows and are asked to respond to the middle arrow
while ignoring the surrounding arrows. In the observation trials,
participants see only the middle arrow and the response given
by the other person. Note that in the current experiment one of
these persons was a confederate because only one MRI scanner
was available. Over the different experimental sessions, four
confederates (one male, three female) were used. All confeder-
ates first received a short training in which they were familiar-
ized with the task and the protocol. Participants and
confederates were not matched on gender. However, because
most participants and most confederates were female, most
couples were female–female couples.
To introduce an element of agency, the participant was as-
signed the role of ‘agent’, while the confederate was assigned
the role of ‘subject’. For the agent, each execution trial was fol-
lowed by an agency trial in which the performance of the agent
determined the difficulty of the flanker trial for the subject.
During these trials, the agent was required to stop a square
from switching its color between green and red. Crucially, (s)he
was told that stopping the square on green would result in a
‘normal’ trial for the subject, whereas stopping the square on
red would result in a ‘difficult’ trial for the subject (Figure 1).
This was important because the agent was informed that the
subject would start with 15 E and win or lose 10 eurocent on
each flanker trial depending on whether a correct or an errone-
ous response was given.
However, a problem with this approach is that it introduces
two confounds. First, in the agency task it is not possible to dis-
tinguish brain activation related to agency from brain activation
related to empathy because the agent is always responsible
when the subject receives a difficult trial. Second, in the flanker
observation task difficult trials are accompanied by a higher
percentage of errors than normal trials. Therefore, observed
errors on difficult trials do not only differ from observed errors
on normal trials with respect to agency but also with respect to
error likelihood. To address these issues, we added a second
block (PC block) to the experiment that differed only from the
first block (ME block) with respect to agency. That is, in the PC
block the agent saw a stationary red or green square on the
screen. He or she was told that (s)he had to press a button to ac-
tivate the computer. The computer would then alternate the
square’s color a random amount of times between green and
red. As a result, it was now the computer that was responsible
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for the difficult trials of the subject. Note that this means that
the ME and PC block were equal in all aspects except for agency.
Comparing brain activation in these two blocks hence allows us
to examine the brain correlates of being responsible for another
person’s errors.
Procedure
The experiment was programmed in Tscope (Stevens et al.,
2006). Participants entered the building together with the con-
federate and the task was explained to them. In addition, it was
told that one person (the participant) would perform the task in-
side the MRI scanner because (s)he had signed up for an fMRI
experiment, whereas the other person (the confederate) would
perform the task at a computer outside the scanner room
because (s)he had signed up for a behavioral experiment. In
reality, however, the performance of the confederate was pre-
programmed. As outlined earlier, the participant was always
assigned the agent role, whereas the confederate was always
assigned the subject role.
In order to make it plausible for the participant that (s)he
would perform the task together with the confederate, they first
practiced an interactive version of the experiment outside of
the scanner room. In the practice phase, the participant and
confederate sat across each other with a monitor placed in front
of each person. It was shown that both monitors were con-
nected to a single computer and it was explained that this made
it possible to observe the trials of the other person. Because we
wanted participants to get acquainted with the role of agent as
well as the role of subject, both roles were practiced for 20 trials
each. After the practice phase, the participant and confederate
were shown the monitor at which the confederate would sit
during the actual experiment. It was shown that this monitor
was connected to the same computer as the monitor in the
scanner room. Participants were told that this setup would
allow them to observe the trials of the confederate even though
they would no longer be in the same room.
As explained above, the experiment consisted of two blocks
(ME and PC) of 100 trials each. The blocks were counterbalanced
and each trial within the blocks could be subdivided into three
consecutive tasks, namely (i) flanker execution task, (ii) agency
task and (iii) flanker observation task (Figure 1). The task trials
were separated by a blank screen that was presented for a jittered
duration. The jitter duration followed a pseudo-logarithmic distri-
bution in which 50% of the blank screens was presented for a
short period (200–2000 ms in steps of 600 ms), 33.3% for an inter-
mediate period (2600 and 4400 ms in steps of 600 ms) and 16.7%
for a long period (5000–6800 ms in steps of 600 ms).
In what follows, we will outline the trial procedure of each
task. The flanker execution task was included to define regions
of interest (ROI) for the action monitoring network. In this task,
participants first saw the flankers for 80 ms (e.g. << <<) before
the relevant stimulus (50% congruent, 50% incongruent) was
added (e.g. <<><<). The presentation time of the relevant
stimulus varied between 30 and 80 ms. Specifically, the presen-
tation time was decreased when the error rate was below 30%
and increased when the error rate was above 30%. This was
done to ensure that the error rate in the flanker execution task
was similar to the error rate of the equivalent trials (i.e. normal)
of the flanker observation task (i.e. 30%). After the presentation
of the whole stimulus array, a mask (#####) appeared on the
screen for 120 ms. Starting from the flanker presentation, par-
ticipants had 700 ms to respond. When subjects did not respond
in time, the message ‘TOO SLOW!!!’ appeared on the screen in
red letters for 500 ms.
In the agency task, it was determined on the basis of a green/
red alternating square whether the co-player would receive a nor-
mal (green) or difficult (red) flanker trial. The trial procedure of
the agency task differed slightly between the two blocks. In the
ME block, the square automatically alternated between green and
red and participants had to stop the square from switching color
by pressing a button. Because we expected participants to aim for
the green square, the switch time of the square was adjusted on-
line to ensure a sufficient amount of red squares. More precisely,
Fig. 1. Trial procedure of the experiment. The only difference between the ME and PC block related to the agency task. In the ME block, the squares started switching
color automatically and participants could stop the alternations by pressing a button. In the PC block, the agency task started with a stationary green or red square.
When participants pressed a button, the squares started alternating between green and red for a random number of times. The intervals between the different tasks
were jittered according to a pseudologarithmic distribution with 50% short intervals (200–2000 ms), 33.3% intermediate intervals (2600 and 4400 ms) and 16.7% long
intervals (5000–6800 ms).
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if >60% of the squares were stopped on green, the switch rate
was increased with 25 ms up until a maximum of 100 ms per
switch. If <60% of the squares were stopped on green, the switch
rate was decreased with 25 ms. In the PC block, participants first
saw a stationary green or red square. Participants then had to
press a button to activate the computer. Finally, the computer
would switch the color of the square a random number of times
between two and seven with a random switch rate between 100
and 250 ms before stopping it on green (60%) or red (40%).
Subjects were given 3000 ms to respond in both blocks. Once the
square was stopped, it remained on the screen in its end color for
1000 ms. When no response was given within the response inter-
val, the color of the square turned red and stayed on the screen
for 1000 ms. This was followed by the message ‘TOO SLOW!!!’ in
red letters for 500 ms.
In the flanker observation task, participants observed the
flanker trial of the other person. The stimulus display in this
task was equal for the normal and difficult trials. Note, how-
ever, that participants experienced both trial types themselves
in the practice phase. Participants saw the middle arrowhead of
the co-player’s stimulus together with two squares that repre-
sented his/her response buttons. When a response was given,
the corresponding square turned black for 500 ms. Because
there was no actual co-player doing the task, responses were
determined by the computer. In order to simulate the response
behavior of a real person, we drew the reaction time from a nor-
mal distribution with a mean of 500 ms and a standard devi-
ation of 100 ms (for a similar procedure see Castellar et al., 2011).
Furthermore, limits were imposed on the reaction time so it
was never faster than 300 ms or slower than 700 ms. Finally, to
make the difference in difficulty between normal and hard trials
believable, the computer was programed to make an error on
30% of the normal trials and on 50% of the difficult trials.
On 5% of the trials within each block, two questions were
asked after the flanker observation task. This was done to check
whether participants were attentive to the task. The first ques-
tion asked if the other person received a normal or a difficult
flanker trial. The second question asked if the other person
gave a correct or an erroneous response. Subjects were required
to respond to these questions by pressing a button.
Finally, after the experiment, participants were debriefed
and filled out a number of questions that measured feelings of
guilt and shame during the experiment (see Supplementary
Materials). Participants were explicitly asked whether they
believed that they played with another person during the
experiment. All participants indicated that they believed this.
Image acquisition
MRI images were acquired with a 3 T scanner (Siemens Trio)
combined with a 32-channel radiofrequency head coil.
Participants were entered head first and supine into the scan-
ner. The scanning procedure started with an anatomical scan in
which 176 high-resolution anatomical images were acquired
using a T1-weighted 3D MPRAGE sequence [repetition time
(TR)¼ 2530 ms, echo time (TE)¼ 2.58 ms, image ma-
trix¼ 256 256, field of view (FOV)¼ 220 mm, flip angle¼ 78,
slice thickness¼ 0.90 mm, voxel size¼ 0.9 0.86 0.86 mm
(resized to 1 1 1 mm)]. Next, two runs (i.e. ME block and PC
block) were conducted in which whole-brain functional images
were obtained. These functional images were acquired using a
T2*-weighted echo planar imaging (EPI) sequence, sensitive to
BOLD contrast (TR¼ 2000 ms, TE¼ 28 ms, image matrix¼ 64 64,
FOV¼ 224 mm, flip angle¼ 80, slice thickness¼ 3.0 mm,
distance factor¼ 17%, voxel size 3.5 3.5 3 mm, 34 axial slices).
The amount of EPI images in the two runs depended on the
speed at which participants performed the task.
Statistical analyses
All data was analyzed with SPM8 (Wellcome Department of
Imaging Neuroscience, UCL, London, UK; www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/
spm). In order to account for T1 relaxation effects, the first four
scans of both runs were dummy scans. With regard to the prepro-
cessing, all functional images were first spatially realigned using a
rigid body transformation. Second, the functional images were
slice-time corrected with respect to the middle acquired slice.
Next, the structural image of each subject was co-registered with
their mean functional image. T1 images were then segmented ac-
cording to the tissue probability maps available in SPM and the
parameters estimated during segmentation were used to normal-
ize the functional images to standard MNI space. Finally, the
images were resampled into 3 mm3 voxels and spatially smoothed
with a Gaussian kernel of 8 mm (full-width at half maximum).
A high-pass filter of 128 Hz was applied during fMRI data
analysis. First level analyses were performed using the general
linear model as applied by SPM8. A model was created with sep-
arate regressors for the three tasks (i.e. flanker execution task,
agency task and flanker observation task). In addition, twelve
regressors (i.e. six for each run) were added to the model to con-
trol for head movement artifacts. The hemodynamic response
function (HRF) in the flanker execution task was modeled for
error and correct trials at the time of the response. The HRF in
the agency task was modeled when the square’s end color was
presented with block (ME vs PC) and outcome (normal vs diffi-
cult) as factors. The HRF in the flanker observation task was
modeled at the time of the observed response with block (ME vs
PC), difficulty (normal vs difficult) and accuracy (error vs correct)
as factors. Contrast images of interest were created at the first
level and were then entered into a second level analysis using
one-sample t tests. We will focus on brain activation that was
significant at the cluster-level (P< 0.05, FWE-corrected) after
applying a whole brain uncorrected threshold of P< 0.001 at the
peak-level. The ROI analyses were conducted using the
MARSBAR package for SPM8 (Brett et al., 2002).
Six participants were excluded from the analyses. One par-
ticipant was excluded for favoring the red square over the green
square in the agency task (60% red). Another participant was
excluded because (s)he did not manage to distinguish between
normal and difficult trials in the PC block (probe accuracy: 40%).
Finally, four participants were excluded due to excessive move-
ment (>3 mm).
For the remaining participants, the following trials were
removed from the data analysis. For the flanker execution task
analyses, we excluded the trials in which the flanker task RT ex-
ceeded the response deadline together with the trials in which
the flanker task RT was faster than 200 ms (8.62%). For the
agency task analyses, we excluded trials in which the agency
task RT exceeded the response deadline (1.03%). Finally, for the
flanker observation analyses, we excluded trials in which the
agency task RT exceeded the response deadline and trials that
were followed by a probe (5.90%).
Results
Behavioral data
In the flanker execution task, the mean response time was
490 ms (SD¼ 50 ms) and the mean error rate was 24.21%
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(SD¼ 10.27%). In the agency task, the mean response time of the
participants was 1152 ms (SD¼ 363 ms) in the ME block and
786 ms (SD¼ 156 ms) in the PC block. In the ME block, the square
was stopped on red in 40.39 % (SD¼ 0.92%) of the trials.
The question on the difficulty of the co-player’s trial was an-
swered correctly in 97% (SD¼ 8%) of the probe trials in the ME
block and in 94% (SD¼ 9%) of the probe trials in the PC block. A
paired samples t test revealed that the percentage of correctly
answered probe trials did not differ between the two blocks,
t¼ 1. The question on the accuracy of the co-player’s trial was
answered correctly in 97% (SD¼ 8%) of the probe trials in the ME
block and in 97% (SD¼ 7%) of the probe trials in the PC block.
Again, a paired samples t test revealed no difference between
the two blocks, t< 1.
Questionnaire data
Feelings of guilt and shame after observing an error are sum-
marized in Table 1 for the different experimental conditions. In
order to test whether participants felt guiltier and more
ashamed after observing an error for which they were respon-
sible, we subjected the questionnaire scores to a block (ME vs
PC)difficulty (normal vs difficult) repeated measures ANOVA.
This revealed a significant blockdifficulty interaction both for
feelings of guilt, F(1, 18)¼ 28.25, P< 0.001, and for feelings of
shame, F(1, 18)¼ 11.03, P¼ 0.004. Follow-up analyses showed
that participants felt guiltier for observed errors on difficult
compared with normal trials in both the ME block, t(18)¼ 8.49,
P< 0.001, and the PC block, t(18)¼ 2.69, P¼ 0.015, but the differ-
ence was considerably larger in the ME block. With regard to
feelings of shame, follow-up analyses revealed that participants
felt more ashamed for observed errors on difficult compared
with normal trials in the ME block, t(18)¼ 4.32, P< 0.001, but not
in the PC block, t< 1.
fMRI data
Flanker execution task. As expected, error related activation
(Error>Correct) was found in the rostral cingulate zone (RCZ),
the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA), the left AI, and
the right middle frontal gyrus (MFG) (Figure 2 and Table 2).
These activation clusters were subsequently used as ROIs for
analyses in the agency task and flanker observation task.
Because activation in the pMFC extended over two anatomically
distinct brain regions and because these regions have been
related to different aspects of error processing (e.g. Ullsperger
and von Cramon, 2001, 2004; Desmet et al., 2011; Yoshida et al.,
2012), we created a separate ROI for the ventral pMFC (vpMFC)
and the dorsal pMFC (dpMFC) by splitting the pMFC activation
cluster in two at the border of the pre-SMA and the RCZ.
Agency task. To examine the brain response to actions that were
likely to elicit an error by the co-player, we subjected activation
in the error monitoring ROIs to a block (ME vs PC)outcome
(normal vs difficult) repeated measures ANOVA (Figure 3). This
revealed a significant blockoutcome interaction in the
vpMFC, F(1, 18)¼ 12.54, P¼ 0.002, the dpMFC, F(1, 18)¼ 28.92,
P< 0.001, the AI, F(1, 18)¼ 13.61, P¼ 0.002, and the LPFC, F(1,
18)¼ 17.26, P¼ 0.001. Follow-up two-tailed t tests showed that
brain activation in all ROIs was increased in the ME block, all
t(18) 3.52, all P 0.002, but not in the PC block, all t(18) 3.52,
all P 0.002, when the outcome for the co-player was a difficult
compared with a normal trial.
Flanker observation task. For the flanker observation task, we
first established whether the error execution defined ROIs were
also involved in error observation. To this end, we compared
observed errors with observed correct responses in the normal
trials separately for each ROI. Note that we focused on these tri-
als because they resembled the flanker execution trials most
closely in terms of error likelihood (i.e. 30%). Two-sided paired t
tests revealed no difference in the vpMFC, t< 1, but a stronger
response to observed errors in the dpMFC, t(18)¼ 3.07, P¼ 0.007,
AI, t(18)¼ 2.65, P¼ 0.016, and the LPFC, t(18)¼ 2.63, P¼ 0.017.
Next, we investigated whether participants processed
observed errors differently depending on whether or not they
shared responsibility for these errors (Figure 4). For this pur-
pose, we first removed confounding activation attributable to
error likelihood by subtracting brain activation in the PC block
from brain activation in the ME block separately for each condi-
tion (see ‘Materials and methods’ section). The obtained differ-
ence scores were then subjected to an accuracy (correct vs
error)difficulty (normal vs difficult) repeated measures
ANOVA. We first computed the main effect of accuracy to test if
the brain response to observed errors differed between the ME
and PC block. This revealed a near-significant accuracy main
effect in the dpMFC, F(1, 18)¼ 4.37, P¼ 0.051, indicating stronger
error observation activation in the ME block compared with the
PC block. No main effect of accuracy was observed in the other
ROIs, all F< 1. We then computed the difficultyaccuracy inter-
action to test the influence of agency on error observation while
controlling for differences in error likelihood. This revealed a
significant interaction in the AI, F(1, 18)¼ 7.54, P¼ 0.013. Follow-
up two-tailed t tests confirmed that this was due to increased
brain activation for observed errors compared with observed
correct responses on the difficult trials, t(18)¼ 2.87, P¼ 0.010, but
not on the normal trials, t< 1. The difficultyaccuracy inter-
action did not reach significance in the three remaining ROIs,
all F(1, 18) 1.27, all P 0.275.
Discussion
Despite the fact that our actions often have a strong influence
on the behavior of others, research on error observation has
hitherto focused primarily on the passive observation of errors
(Shane et al., 2008; Newman-Norlund et al., 2009; Howard-Jones
et al., 2010; Monfardini et al., 2013; Desmet et al., 2014). To extend
error observation research to more realistic interactive contexts,
we therefore investigated how agency over an observed error
can affect how these errors are processed. More specifically, we
designed a task in which the actions of the participants deter-
mined whether another person would get a normal or a difficult
trial. This task allowed us to study agency over observed errors
both before and after the actual error was made.
The study yielded three important results. First, it was found
that the error network was activated when participants created
Table 1. Guilt and shame ratings for observed errors in the different
conditions
Guilt Shame
ME normal 2.63 (1.46) 2.42 (1.31)
ME difficult 5.53 (1.12) 3.95 (1.75)
PC normal 2.05 (1.39) 1.90 (0.99)
PC difficult 2.74 (1.79) 2.00 (1.33)
Note. Means are displayed with standard deviations between parentheses.
Ratings were given on a 7-point Likert scale.
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a difficult situation for someone else. Crucially, the same activa-
tion was not found when the difficult situation was created by
the computer, excluding the possibility that it reflected a gen-
eral empathic response. Instead, the results suggest that an
action that will likely lead to an error by someone else is eval-
uated in the same way as an error. This is in line with previous
studies that revealed error network activation when an action
caused pain to someone else (Koban et al., 2013; Yu et al., 2014;
Cui et al., 2015) and confirms that the action monitoring system
is not only sensitive to actions with negative consequences
for oneself, but also to actions with negative consequences for
other persons.
Second, we confirmed previous studies in which activation
in the dpMFC, LPFC and AI was found in response to both self-
generated (e.g. Ullsperger and von Cramon, 2001, 2004; Marco-
Pallare´s et al., 2008) and observed (e.g. Shane et al., 2008; De
Bruijn et al., 2009; Desmet et al., 2014) errors. Activation in the
vpMFC, on the other hand, was found to be restricted to self-
generated errors. Interestingly, a similar dissociation was
recently reported in a single-neuron study in macaques
(Yoshida et al., 2012). This study revealed that the ventral and
dorsal regions of the pMFC have different functions within the
error observation process. More specifically, it was found that
the dpMFC is involved in the general detection of vicarious
errors, whereas the vpMFC is involved in adapting personal
behavior to these errors. Applied to the current study, the
absence of error observation related activation in the vpMFC
could be explained by the fact that observed errors were unin-
formative to improve personal performance. That is, the stimu-
lus display in the flanker observation task provided information
about the outcome of the co-player’s trial, but it did not provide
information on how this outcome was achieved. Without the
latter, however, observed errors do not inform participants how
they should adapt their behavior to increase personal
performance.
Finally, sense of agency over an observed error differentially
modulated brain activation in the previously defined error ob-
servation network. In particular, it was found that activation in
the AI but not in the pMFC or LPFC was sensitive to whether or
not the error was caused by the observer. Interestingly, the
AI activation pattern was accompanied by higher feelings of
guilt and shame when seeing errors for which participants
bore responsibility (see also Koban et al., 2013; Yu et al., 2014).
In accordance with the idea that the AI is associated
with the affective evaluation of intentional behavior
(Brass and Haggard, 2010; Koban and Pourtois, 2014), these find-
ings suggest that the AI performs an emotional evaluation of
observed errors based on the degree of agency over the error.
Interestingly, this interpretation fits well with a recent theoret-
ical framework concerning the influence of social factors in
error monitoring (Koban and Pourtois, 2014). In this framework,
it was proposed that the different regions within the error
monitoring network perform different yet complementary func-
tions. Specifically, it was argued that the role of the pMFC is to
determine whether an action is erroneous or correct, whereas
the role of the AI is to evaluate the resulting information in a
broader context of agency and social factors. Although this
framework was primarily constructed to account for findings in
the domain of error execution, the findings of the current study
suggest that similar functions can be ascribed to these regions
during error observation. Taken together with previous studies
on error execution (Koban et al., 2013; Yu et al., 2014; Cui et al.,
2015), the results of the current study thus support the idea that
the AI generates an affective signal that indicates the need to
adjust our behavior when our actions cause another person
harm. As such, the AI can be thought of as an important brain
region in regulating social behavior.
It should be noted however, that it appears from Figure 4
that agency primarily influenced AI responses to observed cor-
rect responses rather than to observed erroneous responses.
However, directly comparing activation between the two blocks
and between the two situations is not trivial in the flanker ob-
servation task. The fact that participants created a difficult situ-
ation for the co-player in the difficult ME trials makes it likely
that an emotional response was generated in this situation
even before the performance of the co-player was observed.
Such emotional responses are known to be the target of emo-
tion regulation processes (Ochsner and Gross, 2005, 2008) that
inhibit activation in emotion areas such as the AI (e.g. Ochsner
and Gross, 2005, 2008; Goldin et al., 2008; Grecucci et al., 2013). It
is therefore probable that overall AI activation was reduced in
the flanker observation task when participants had created a
difficult situation for the co-player. Such baseline differences
strongly limit the conclusions that one can draw from a direct
comparison between the two blocks or between the two situ-
ations. Therefore, we instead chose to focus on relative com-
parisons based on the difference in activation between
observed errors and observed correct responses. These relative
comparisons clearly indicated that agency modulated the AI
response to observed errors.
Fig. 2. Sagittal (x¼ 6), coronal (y¼27) and axial (z¼31) planes depicting brain activation resulting from the flanker execution task contrast Error>Correct (see fig. S1 for
t-score maps). Based on this activation, ROIs were created for the analysis of the agency task and the flanker observation task. Activation clusters in the figure are color
coded to represent the different ROIs. The red area represents the dpMFC ROI, the green area represents the vpMFC ROI, the blue area represents the AI ROI, and the
purple area represents the LPFC ROI. Note that the vpMFC and dpMFC ROI were created by splitting the pMFC activation cluster in two at the border of the pre-SMA and
the RCZ.
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In constrast to the activation pattern of the AI, activation in
the LPFC and dpMFC suggested that these regions perform a
more general error detection function during error observation
(e.g. Yoshida et al., 2012). Interestingly, however, the observation
that dpMFC activation to vicarious errors was still seen after acti-
vation in the PC block was subtracted from activation in the ME
block suggests that error detection in this region is modulated by
context. Specifically, it indicates that the dpMFC is more involved
in monitoring the actions of others in an active compared with a
passive situation. At least two explanations could be postulated
for this finding. First, it is possible that individuals simply at-
tended more closely to the task of the other person in the ME
block. However, this seems unlikely given that probe questions
were answered equally well in both blocks. Second, it is possible
that vicarious errors in the ME block triggered the dpMFC more
strongly because the active context caused participants to
Fig. 3. Results of the agency task ROI analysis. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean corrected for within subject designs according to Morey (2008).
Table 2. MNI Coordinates of the Error>Correct contrast in the
flanker execution task
Peak coordinates Z-score Cluster size
RCZ, pre-SMA 3, 26, 37 4.91 366
9, 23, 61 4.27
3, 11, 64 4.18
Right MFG 21, 53, 31 4.24 78
Left AI, IFG 42, 20, 11 4.15 89
30, 29, 1 3.82
RCZ, rostral cingulate zone, pre-SMA, pre-supplementary motor area; MFG, mid-
dle frontal gyrus; AI, anterior insula; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus.
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empathize more with the other person. This is in line with previ-
ous studies on error observation that have linked activation in
the error network to individual differences in empathy (e.g.
Newman-Norlund et al., 2009; Shane et al., 2009).
In summary, the current study examined the influence of
agency on activation in the error observation network. In
accordance with the idea that the outcome of an action is first
evaluated in the pMFC and then forwarded to the AI where it is
integrated with information on agency and social context
(Koban et al., 2013; Koban and Pourtois, 2014), it was found that
activation in the AI but not the pMFC was modulated by agency
over the observed error. Interestingly, the activation pattern in
the AI was mirrored by feelings of guilt and shame. This
suggests that the AI is crucially involved in evaluating the social
consequences of an action.
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